Dualism is a doctrine engaged on two fronts. It affirms a thesis about the mind, in opposition to various forms of materialism and mental reductionism, and a thesis about the physical world, in opposition to various forms of mentalism and idealism. The Immaterial Self is a defense of the Cartesian account in which the immaterial contents of the mind are assigned to an immaterial mental subject. The book combines a vigorous attack on alternative accounts of the mind with a careful defense of the position of the Cartesian dualist. It tackles both the theories of the mind which oppose dualism--behaviorism, functionalism, and the type and token identity theories--and those which endorse it in its human form. Particular attention is given to the issues of psychophysical causation and the nature of the Cartesian self. The remainder of the book extends the dualist position and provides positive accounts of the attachment of the self to the body, its power of free agency, and its role in personal identity.

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