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230915s2023 nyu b 001 0 eng |
010 |
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|a 2023032461
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020 |
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|a9780197690888|q(hbk.) :|cNT$686
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020 |
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|a9780197690895|q(epub)
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020 |
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|a9780197690918|q(ebk.)
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040 |
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|aDLC|beng|cDLC|dDLC|dTMUE|eaacr
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042 |
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|apcc
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050 |
00
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|aBJ11|b.N24 2024
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082 |
00
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|a170|223/eng/20230928
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095 |
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|aTMUE|b41|cA0339725|pB|d170|eN147|y2023|tDDC|r686
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100 |
1
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|aNagel, Thomas,|d1937-
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245 |
10
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|aMoral feelings, moral reality, and moral progress /|cThomas Nagel.
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260 |
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|aNew York, NY :|bOxford University Press,|cc2023.
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300 |
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|aviii, 71 p. ;|c19 cm.
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504 |
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|aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
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505 |
0
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|aGut feelings and moral knowledge -- Moral reality and moral progress.
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520 |
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|a"This book consists of two essays that are related to each other: "Gut Feelings and Moral Knowledge" and "Moral Reality and Moral Progress." The longer second essay has not been previously published. Both are concerned with moral epistemology and our means of access to moral truth; both are concerned with moral realism and with the resistance to subjectivist and reductionist accounts of morality; and both are concerned with the historical development of moral knowledge. The second essay also proposes an account of the historical development of moral truth, according to which it does not share the timelessness of scientific truth. This is because moral truth must be based on reasons that are accessible to the individuals to whom they apply, and such accessibility depends on historical developments"--|cProvided by publisher.
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650 |
0
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|aEthics.
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650 |
0
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|aEmotions (Philosophy)
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650 |
0
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|aMoral realism.
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650 |
0
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|aKnowledge, Theory of.
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